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Abstract 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 has introduced into our 
company law an innovative provision which permits a wide 
range of persons to apply to court to declare a director 
delinquent. This provision is contained in section 162 of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008. The effect of an order of 
delinquency is that a person is disqualified for a specified period 
from being a director of a company. In Gihwala v Grancy 
Property Limited 2016 ZASCA 35 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
was faced with some important questions pertaining to the 
declaration of delinquency of a director. It was contended by the 
appellants that section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it was retrospective 
in its application, and that there was no discretion vested in a 
court to refuse to make a delinquency order or to moderate the 
period of such an order to less than seven years. It was further 
contended that section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 infringed the constitutional right to dignity, the right to 
choose a trade, occupation or profession and the right to 
access to courts. In assessing these contentions, the SCA 
addressed and clarified some important questions surrounding 
the declaration of delinquency of a director. This note discusses 
and analyses the judgment of the SCA. It points out some 
anomalies in section 162 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. It 
contends that, in assessing the rationality of section 162(5) of 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the SCA ought to have 
considered the equivalent provisions in leading foreign 
jurisdictions that have influenced our Act, particularly since 
section 5(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 permits a court 
where appropriate to consider foreign law in interpreting the 
Act. Further, this note analyses the test applied by courts in 
determining whether the offences set out in section 162(5) of 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 have been committed, and 
argues that the courts ought to make more effective use of their 
power to impose ancillary conditions to declarations of 
delinquency. 
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1  Introduction 
An innovative provision of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter the 
Act) is that for the first time in South African law, provision is made for a 
court to declare a director delinquent or to have him placed under an order 
of probation. Under section 162 of the Act a wide range of persons may 
apply to court to declare a person delinquent if the person is a director of 
the company or within 24 months immediately preceding the application 
was a director of that company, and any of the circumstances 
contemplated in section 162(5) of the Act are applicable.1 Some of the 
grounds under which a court must declare a director delinquent under 
section 162(5) of the Act are if the director acted in the capacity as a 
director while ineligible or disqualified to do so, contravened a probation 
order, or while a director grossly abused his position or acted in a manner 
that amounted to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in 
relation to the performance of his functions and duties as a director. 
The effect of an order of delinquency is that a person is disqualified from 
being a director of a company and is thus prohibited from being a director 
of a company.2 As the court in Kukama v Lobelo3 said, in view of the effect 
of an order declaring a director delinquent under section 162(5) of the Act, 
it is not necessary to also order his removal as such due to the automatic 
inherent effect of removal upon such an order. Section 162 of the Act is 
directed at protecting companies and corporate stakeholders against 
company directors who have proven themselves unable to manage the 
business of the company or have failed in, or are in neglect of, their duties 
and obligations as company directors.4 The rationale for this remedy is 
                                            
*  Rehana Cassim. BA (cum laude), LLB (cum laude), LLM (cum laude) 
(Witwatersrand). Senior Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, University of South 
Africa, Attorney and Notary Public of the High Court of South Africa. E-mail: 
cassir@unisa.ac.za. 
1  The persons who have locus standi under s 162 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
(the Act) are a company, a shareholder, a director, a company secretary, a 
prescribed officer, a registered trade union that represents employees of the 
company or another representative of the employees of a company, the Companies 
and Intellectual Property Commission, the Takeover Regulation Panel and an organ 
of state responsible for the administration of any legislation. It is important to guard 
against abuse by those persons with locus standi making these applications, 
because such persons may well use the mechanism of applying to court to declare a 
director delinquent to lodge vexatious claims, which may result in damage being 
caused to the reputation of directors (Cassim "Governance and the Board of 
Directors" 436). 
2  Section 69(8)(a) of the Act. 
3  Kukama v Lobelo 2012 JDR 0062 (GSJ) para 21. Also see Msimang v Katuliiba 
2012 JDR 2391 (GSJ) para 32. 
4  Msimang v Katuliiba 2012 JDR 2391 (GSJ) para 29. 
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that a director who is guilty of a serious abuse of his position should not be 
permitted to continue to hold a directorship, or should be permitted to do 
so only under strict conditions imposed by a court.5 Section 162 of the Act 
sets out to raise the standards of good behaviour and integrity expected of 
directors and makes them accountable to the company, the shareholders, 
fellow directors, and even the employees of the company.6 
In Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited7 (hereafter Gihwala) one of the 
issues before the Supreme Court of Appeal (hereafter SCA) was whether 
or not to confirm a declaration of delinquency made by the Western Cape 
Division of the High Court in Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala,8 
(hereafter Grancy) against Mr Gihwala (First Appellant) and Mr Manala 
(Second Appellant). The court of first instance had declared the First and 
Second Appellants delinquent directors as contemplated in section 
162(5)(c) of the Act. The SCA, per Wallis JA, unanimously approved the 
declaration of delinquency handed down by the court of first instance. This 
note will critically evaluate the relevant aspects of Gihwala relating to the 
declaration of delinquency. The judgment is noteworthy as it addresses 
and clarifies certain important questions surrounding the declaration of 
delinquency of a director. 
2  The facts 
The First and Second Appellants were directors of Seena Marena 
Investments (Pty) Ltd (hereafter SMI). The Dines Gihwala Family Trust 
and the Second Appellant were equal shareholders of SMI. In 2005 the 
First and Second Appellants entered into a verbal agreement with Grancy 
Property Limited for the company to acquire a one-third shareholding in 
SMI. SMI needed the funding from Grancy Property Limited to enable it to 
acquire a stake in a special purpose vehicle formed as part of a black 
economic empowerment transaction linked to a property loan stock 
company listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The Second 
Appellant lacked the resources to pay for his shares in SMI as a one-third 
shareholder. It was consequently agreed between the parties that the First 
Appellant and Grancy Property Limited would each loan a sum of money 
to the Second Appellant to enable the Second Appellant to pay for his 
shares in SMI. The agreement between the parties was that the loans 
would attract interest at a commercial rate and if and when the Second 
                                            
5  Cassim 2013 De Rebus 29. 
6  Cassim 2013 De Rebus 29. 
7  Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 2016 ZASCA 35 (Gihwala). 
8  Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) (Grancy). 
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Appellant realised his interests at a profit, the First Appellant and Grancy 
Property Limited would share in a proportion of the profit. It was agreed 
that the First Appellant would draft an agreement acknowledging the one-
third share of Grancy Property Limited in SMI.  
The business relationship between the parties soured for various reasons. 
The First and Second Appellants failed to register Grancy Property Limited 
as a shareholder of SMI and resisted its attempts to secure its registration 
in the share register. Furthermore, information sought by Grancy Property 
Limited regarding its investment was not forthcoming from the First 
Appellant, and despite numerous requests, Grancy Property Limited was 
not given access to the books and records of SMI nor to its annual 
financial statements. Of great concern to Grancy Property Limited was that 
the First Appellant had failed to conclude the agreement acknowledging its 
one-third share in SMI. More worrying was the fact that the First and 
Second Appellants had made various payments to themselves, and had 
received dividend payments from the special purpose vehicle in question 
but had failed to share with Grancy Property Limited any funds received by 
SMI, even though Grancy Property Limited was a shareholder of SMI. 
Instead of repaying Grancy Property Limited its loan to SMI, at the 
instigation of the First Appellant, an investment was made by the First 
Appellant in a property development company in which the First 
Appellant's wife and the Dines Gihwala Family Trust had an interest.  
In 2011 Grancy Property Limited sought an order inter alia declaring the 
First and Second Appellants delinquent directors in terms of section 
162(5)(c) of the Act. The events relied upon to justify the delinquency 
order had occurred before 1 May 2011, which is the effective date of the 
Act. The court of first instance granted the delinquency order. The First 
and Second Appellants contended that section 162(5) of the Act was 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it was retrospective in its application, 
and that there was no discretion vested in the court by section 162(5)(c) 
as read with section 162(6)(b)(ii) of the Act to refuse to make a 
delinquency order or to moderate the period of such order to less than 
seven years. The First and Second Appellants contended further that 
section 162(5)(c) infringed the constitutional right to dignity (section 10 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of the South Africa, 1996, hereafter the 
Constitution), the right to choose a trade, occupation or profession (section 
22 of the Constitution) and the right to access to courts (section 34 of the 
Constitution). The SCA was accordingly required to determine if section 
162(5)(c) of the Act had retrospective effect and whether it was 
unconstitutional. 
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3  The judgment 
The SCA ruled that, for the following reasons, the conduct of the First and 
Second Appellants fell squarely within the scope of section 162(5)(c) of 
the Act: 
(i) The directors of SMI in the performance of their duties had been 
under an obligation to ensure that the share register of SMI properly 
reflected the persons who were entitled to be registered as 
shareholders. This duty had been violated by the First and Second 
Appellants for some four years. 
(ii) The First and Second Appellants had failed to ensure that SMI kept 
proper accounting records.  
(iii) The loans provided to the Second Appellant had contravened 
section 226 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (hereafter the 1973 
Companies Act), and this had caused loss to SMI because it had 
not been able to recover the loans from the Second Appellant.9 The 
SCA found that this loss was as a result of gross negligence on the 
part of both the First and Second Appellants. In the light of the fact 
that the First Appellant was, at the time, a businessman and 
attorney, the chairman of one of South Africa's largest law firms, 
and the chairman of Redefine Income Fund Limited, which was one 
of the largest property loan stock companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the SCA found that his failure to 
comply with the requirements of section 226 of the 1973 
Companies Act was "inexcusable".10  
(iv) The conduct of the First and Second Appellants in appropriating 
financial benefits for themselves and in excluding Grancy Property 
Limited from the benefits of these investments had entailed gross 
abuses of the position of director. Such conduct, the court held, fell 
squarely within the scope of section 162(5)(c) of the Act.  
(v) The actions of the First and Second Appellants constituted wilful 
misconduct because such actions were intentional and done with 
knowledge of the obligations owed to Grancy Property Limited 
under the investment agreement. At the very least, the SCA said, it 
was gross negligence akin to recklessness, and had involved a 
                                            
9  Section 226 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (1973 Companies Act) prohibited a 
company from making certain loans to a director of the company, subject to certain 
exceptions. 
10  Gihwala para 136. 
R CASSIM  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  6 
breach of trust in relation to the performance of the duties of the 
First and Second Appellants as directors.11 
In its finding that section 162(5)(c) of the Act was not retrospective, the 
SCA drew on the well-established legal principle emanating from R v St 
Mary's Whitechapel (Inhabitants)12 that a statute is not retrospective 
merely "because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time 
antecedent to its passing".13 
In assessing the constitutional challenge to section 162(5)(c) of the Act, 
the SCA dismissed the contention that the absence of a discretion 
conferred on a court to decide whether or not a director should be 
declared delinquent had rendered section 162(5)(c) unconstitutional. The 
First and Second Appellants had not attacked section 162(5)(c) of the Act 
on the basis that it was irrational, which was detrimental to their argument 
regarding the constitutionality of section 162(5)(c) of the Act.14 The SCA 
examined the purpose of section 162(5) of the Act and held that, contrary 
to the submissions on behalf of the First and Second Appellants, it is not a 
penal provision. Its purpose is to protect the sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investing public against the type of conduct that leads to a 
delinquency order, and to protect those who deal with companies against 
the misconduct of delinquent directors.15 The SCA proclaimed that section 
162(5) of the Act was rational and found that the provision is an 
appropriate and a proportionate response by the legislature to the problem 
of delinquent directors and the harm they may cause to the public who 
place their trust in them.16 The SCA asserted that even though the 
legislation in other jurisdictions may give their courts a wider discretion in 
this regard, this does not render our legislation constitutionally 
problematic.17  
Regarding the absence of a discretion to decide the period of delinquency 
when section 162(5)(c) has been infringed, the SCA pointed out that a 
court has been given the power to relax the minimum period of seven 
                                            
11  Gihwala para 139. 
12  R v St Mary's Whitechapel (Inhabitants) 116 ER 811 (1848) 814. 
13  Gihwala para 141. 
14  Legislation must serve a rational purpose and there must be a rational connection 
between the purpose of the legislation and the provision under consideration. The 
absence of such a rational connection would result in the provision being 
unconstitutional (Gihwala para 145; New National Party of South Africa v 
Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 3 SA 191 (CC) paras 19 and 24). 
15  Gihwala para 142. 
16  Gihwala para 145. 
17  Gihwala para 145. 
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years prescribed by section 162(6)(b) of the Act after a period of three 
years and to place the delinquent director under probation (in terms of 
section 162(11) of the Act). There is consequently a power to relax the full 
effect of a declaration of delinquency once the delinquent director has 
demonstrated that this is appropriate.18  
The constitutional challenge that section 162(5)(c) of the Act infringed 
section 22 of the Constitution (the right to choose a trade, occupation or 
profession) also failed because the First and Second Appellants had failed 
to suggest that section 162(5)(c) was capricious or arbitrary. The SCA also 
dismissed the constitutional challenge that section 162(5) of the Act had 
infringed the right of access to courts under section 34 of the Constitution 
on the basis that this argument was misconceived because the court is in 
fact involved at every stage of an enquiry under section 162(5) of the Act. 
Consequently before a declaration of delinquency is made, the errant 
director gets an "entirely fair hearing before a court".19 Regarding the 
constitutional challenge that section 162(5) of the Act infringed the right to 
dignity (section 10 of the Constitution), the SCA ruled that this challenge 
may be pursued only by attacking the rationality of section 162 of the Act. 
The First and Second Appellants had failed to do this.20  
The SCA accordingly found that the court a quo in Grancy had correctly 
rejected the attacks on the constitutionality of section 162(5)(c) of the Act, 
and the appeal against the delinquency orders granted by the court a quo 
failed.21 
4  Analysis  
4.1  Purpose of section 162(5) of the Act 
Regarding the purpose of section 162(5) of the Act, the SCA in Gihwala 
stated that this provision has a protective purpose. Its aim is to ensure that 
those who invest in companies are protected against directors who 
engage in serious misconduct of the type that violates the bond of trust 
that shareholders have in the people they appoint to the board of 
directors.22  
                                            
18  Gihwala para 144. 
19  Gihwala para 147. 
20  Gihwala para 150. 
21  Gihwala para 150. 
22  Gihwala para 144. 
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In Re Gold Coast Holdings Pty Ltd (In Liq); Australian Securities & 
Investments Commission v Papotto23 the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (hereafter ASIC) sought an order from the 
Supreme Court of Western Australia to prohibit the respondent from 
managing a company for a period to be determined by the court. The 
respondent had been convicted of repeated acts of dishonesty as a 
director. In disqualifying the respondent from managing any company for 
seven years, the court stated that the purpose of the order sought by ASIC 
was protective and not punitive, and that the interests to be protected by 
the order included those of the public who may unwittingly deal with 
companies run by people "who are not suitable to be involved in the 
management of companies".24 The SCA in Gihwala relied on this case in 
ruling that section 162(5) of the Act is not a penal provision, but its 
purpose is to protect the investing public.25  
It is submitted, however, that while the purpose of section 162(5) of the 
Act may not be penal, there is undoubtedly a punitive element in the 
proceedings, and that if the power to declare a director delinquent is 
exercised by the court, there is inevitably a substantial and significant 
interference with the freedom of the individual. This is affirmed in Re Lo-
Line Electric Motors Ltd,26 where Browne-Wilkinson V-C asserted that the 
power to disqualify a person from acting as a director is not fundamentally 
penal but if the power to disqualify is exercised it does involve a 
substantial interference with the freedom of the individual.27 It follows that 
the rights of the individual must be fully protected.28 In a similar vein, in Re 
Crestjoy Products Ltd29 the court approved of and adopted the above 
approach of Browne-Wilkinson V-C and commented further that 
proceedings to disqualify a person from acting as a director are a very 
serious matter, and that when a court is faced with a mandatory 
                                            
23  Re Gold Coast Holdings Pty Ltd (In Liq); Australian Securities & Investments 
Commission v Papotto 2000 WASC 201. 
24 Re Gold Coast Holdings Pty Ltd (In Liq); Australian Securities & Investments 
Commission v Papotto 2000 WASC 201 para 22. 
25  Gihwala para 142. 
26  Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd 1988 2 All ER 692. 
27  Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd 1988 2 All ER 692 696. An analysis of whether or not 
the infringement of the freedom of the individual is justifiable under the limitation 
clause in the Constitution is beyond the scope of this note. 
28  Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd 1988 2 All ER 692 696. The court commented that 
ordinary commercial misjudgment is in itself not sufficient to justify disqualification, 
and that in the normal case the conduct complained of must display a lack of 
commercial probity (696). The court commented further that in an extreme case of 
gross negligence or total incompetence, disqualification could be appropriate (697). 
29  Re Crestjoy Products Ltd 1990 BCC 23. 
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disqualification period once the facts are proved, the matter becomes 
more nearly penal.30  
A further punitive effect of a declaration of delinquency is that it carries a 
definite stigma for a person who is disqualified from acting as a director. 
The reputational damage caused by such an order is extensive and is 
likely to endure for a long period of time. This was affirmed in Re 
Westminister Property Management Ltd Official Receiver v Stern,31 where 
the court emphasised that while proceedings to disqualify a person from 
acting as a director are intended primarily for the protection of the public, 
they do nevertheless involve serious allegations and almost always carry a 
degree of stigma for anyone who is disqualified from acting as a director. 
In Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission32 the High 
Court of Australia asserted that protective proceedings and punitive 
proceedings are not mutually exclusive categories, and that proceedings 
brought to protect the public could also have the effect of penalising the 
defendant.33 In the light of the above dicta, it is submitted that while the 
purpose of section 162(5) of the Act may not be penal, as maintained by 
the SCA in Gihwala, proceedings to declare a director delinquent that 
disable him from acting as a director do have a punitive effect, even if the 
making of such a declaration has a protective purpose. 
In Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Druker34 (hereafter Druker) the 
Western Cape High Court declared that in the determination of the 
question of whether or not a person may be declared a delinquent director, 
the purpose of the Act as set out in section 7 must always be borne in 
mind.35 The purposes of section 7 of the Act as emphasised by the court in 
this context are to promote compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided 
in the Constitution in the application of company law; to encourage the 
efficient and responsible management of companies, and to provide a 
predictable and effective environment for the efficient regulation of 
companies.36 It is submitted that, at the same time, a further purpose 
ought to be considered, namely to promote the development of the South 
                                            
30  Re Crestjoy Products Ltd 1990 BCC 23 26. 
31  Re Westminister Property Management Ltd Official Receiver v Stern 2001 BCC 121 
para 36. 
32  Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2004 HCA 42. 
33  Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2004 HCA 42 para 35. 
See further Austin and Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay's Principles of 
Corporations Law 105, 265-266. 
34  Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Druker 2013 JDR 1360 (WCC) (Druker). 
35  Druker para 85. 
36  Druker para 85. 
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African economy by encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise 
efficiency, as set out in section 7(b)(i) of the Act. Declaring a director 
delinquent is a severe remedy with harsh consequences for directors. It 
must not be applied without due and proper consideration by a court. As 
the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies37 
emphasised, per Hobhouse LJ, to be a director of a company is a 
privilege, but it is not one of which a person should be unjustly deprived. 
4.2  Retrospectivity  
The Act came into operation on 1 May 2011, and the gist of the 
retrospectivity challenge to section 162(5) of the Act in Gihwala was 
whether or not the provision applied in regard to conduct which occurred 
prior to this date.  
At common law a statute is presumed not to have retrospective effect, 
save if the presumption is rebutted by provisions or indications in the 
statute, either expressly or by necessary implication.38 The presumption 
against retrospectivity does not apply when it must be inferred from the 
provisions of the statute in question that the legislature intended the 
statute to be retrospective.39 The presumption against retrospectivity is 
based on the elementary considerations of fairness that one should know 
what the law entails in order to adjust one's conduct accordingly, and that 
the legislature must not be taken to have intended anything unjust.40 In 
National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC41 the SCA defined what it 
means for a statute to be retrospective, as follows:  
A statute is retrospective in its effect if it takes away or impairs a vested right 
acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty 
or attaches a new disability in regard to events already past.42  
As stated earlier, Lord Denman in a much quoted dictum in R v St Mary's 
Whitechapel (Inhabitants)43 asserted that a statute is not retrospective 
merely "because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time 
                                            
37  Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies 1996 4 All ER 289 302. 
38  Workmen's Compensation Commissioner v Jooste 1997 4 SA 418 (SCA) 424. 
39  See Lek v Estate Agents Board 1978 3 SA 160 (C) 169. 
40  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus 2000 1 SA 1127 (SCA) paras 31, 
36. 
41  National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 1995 1 SA 475 (A). 
42  National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 1995 1 SA 475 (A) 483. 
43  R v St Mary's Whitechapel (Inhabitants) 116 ER 811 (1848). 
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antecedent to its passing".44 In finding that section 162(5) of the Act is not 
retrospective, the SCA in Gihwala relied on this dictum of Lord Denman.45  
It is submitted, however, that in considering the retrospectivity of section 
162(5) of the Act, the SCA overlooked the definition of retrospectivity as 
advocated in National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC.46 If this 
definition of retrospectivity is applied to section 162(5) of the Act, it is 
arguable that the provision is in fact retrospective as it creates "a new 
disability in regard to events already past".47 In Grancy the court affirmed 
that section 162(5) of the Act introduces prospective consequences to 
conduct which was already unlawful,48 and that the innovative aspect of 
section 162(5) of the Act is that it introduces a new civil remedy for those 
harmed by the conduct of delinquent directors.49 
Under section 219 of the 1973 Companies Act a court was empowered to 
make an order prohibiting a director from taking part in the management of 
a company in certain circumstances. In Grancy the court stated that all the 
categories of conduct provided in section 162(5)(c) of the Act were 
covered by section 219(1)(c)(ii) of the 1973 Companies Act.50 It is 
respectfully submitted, however, that the grounds provided in section 
219(1)(c)(ii) of the 1973 Companies Act were in fact much narrower than 
those provided in section 162(5)(c) of the Act. Section 219(1)(c)(ii) of the 
Act disqualified a person from being a director of a company if in the 
course of the winding-up or judicial management of the company it 
appeared that such a person had been guilty of fraud in relation to the 
company or of any breach of his duty to the company. Section 162(5)(c) of 
the Act, on the other hand, is much wider than section 219(1)(c)(ii) of the 
1973 Companies Act, since an application to declare a director delinquent 
and thus to disqualify him from acting as a director would apply if a 
director breached his duties to the company at any time while a director. It 
is not required under section 162(5)(c) of the Act that such conduct must 
appear in the course of the winding-up of the company. It is consequently 
submitted that, contrary to the observation of the court in Grancy, not all 
                                            
44  R v St Mary's Whitechapel (Inhabitants) 116 ER 811 (1848) 814. See further R v 
Grainger 1958 2 SA 443 (A) 446; Adampol (Pty) Ltd v Administrator, Transvaal 1989 
3 SA 800 (A) 812, 817-818; Swanepoel v Johannesburg City Council; President 
Insurance Co Ltd v Kruger 1994 3 SA 789 (A) 793-794; and Krok v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service 2015 6 SA 317 (SCA) para 40. 
45  Gihwala para 141. 
46  National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 1995 1 SA 475 (A). 
47  See National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 1995 1 SA 475 (A) 483. 
48  Grancy para 164. 
49  Grancy para 155. 
50  Grancy para 175. 
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the categories of conduct provided for in section 162(5)(c) of the Act were 
covered by section 219(1)(c)(ii) of the Act. The remedy of declaring a 
director delinquent is a new disability which did not exist prior to 1 May 
2011. Thus, even though a part of the requisites for the action under 
section 162(5) of the Act may be drawn prior to 1 May 2011, which, 
according to the dictum in R v St Mary's Whitechapel (Inhabitants)51 does 
not make section 162(5) of the Act retrospective, the fact that section 162 
of the Act creates a new disability in regard to past events would, it is 
submitted, make section 162(5) of the Act retrospective. 
In making its finding regarding the retrospectivity of section 162(5) of the 
Act, the SCA in Gihwala did not consider the earlier judgment of the North 
Gauteng High Court, Pretoria in Pride 73 Properties (Pty) Ltd v Theunis 
Christoffel Du Toit52 (hereafter Pride 73 Properties). In Pride 73 Properties 
the court held that conduct which occurred prior to 1 May 2011 could not 
be taken into account in any court application in terms of section 162(5) of 
the Act. The court reasoned that if section 162(5) of the Act had 
retrospective effect the rights of directors to engage freely in economic 
activities and to be involved in business ventures at all levels would be 
infringed.53 In the view of the court, this was not envisaged by 
Parliament.54 The court accordingly held that any retrospective application 
of section 162(5) of the Act would operate unfairly towards directors. 
Consequently, in considering the application which had been brought 
under section 162(5)(c) of the Act, the court declined to take into 
consideration the conduct of the relevant directors that had occurred prior 
to 1 May 2011. 
However, as pointed out earlier, a statute may be interpreted 
retrospectively if it must be inferred from the provisions of the statute in 
question that the legislature intended the statute to be retrospective.55 Item 
7(7) of Schedule 5 to the Act would be an indication that the legislature 
intended section 162(5) of the Act to be interpreted retrospectively. Item 
7(7) of Schedule 5 to the Act states as follows:  
A right of any person to seek a remedy in terms of this Act applies with respect 
to conduct pertaining to a pre-existing company and occurring before the 
                                            
51  R v St Mary's Whitechapel (Inhabitants) 116 ER 811 (1848) 814. 
52  Pride 73 Properties (Pty) Ltd v Theunis Christoffel Du Toit 2013 JDR 2001 (GNP) 
(Pride 73 Properties). 
53  Pride 73 Properties para 43. 
54  Pride 73 Properties para 45. 
55  See Workmen's Compensation Commissioner v Jooste 1997 4 SA 418 (SCA) 424; 
and Lek v Estate Agents Board 1978 3 SA 160 (C) 169. 
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effective date, unless the person had commenced proceedings in a court in 
respect of the same conduct before the effective date. 
Section 162(5) of the Act provides a remedy in the Act as referred to in 
item 7(7) of Schedule 5, that is, a remedy to have a director declared 
delinquent,56 and accordingly section 162(5) of the Act would apply with 
respect to conduct pertaining to a pre-existing company57 if such conduct 
had occurred prior to the effective date of 1 May 2011, provided no legal 
proceedings in respect of that conduct had been commenced before that 
date. In Grancy the Western Cape High Court found that the wording of 
item 7(7) of Schedule 5 to the Act is clear that in an application under 
section 162 of the Act past conduct of the relevant director may be taken 
into account, unless legal proceedings in respect thereof had already been 
commenced before 1 May 2011.58 It appears that the court in Pride 73 
Properties had in fact overlooked the provisions of item 7(7) of Schedule 5 
to the Act.  
It is submitted that even though the SCA in Gihwala did not consider and 
did not apply the definition of retrospectivity laid down in National Iranian 
Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC,59 the correct conclusion regarding the 
retrospectivity of section 162(5) of the Act was nonetheless reached by the 
SCA because item 7(7) of Schedule 5 to the Act indicates clearly that the 
legislature intended that conduct prior to 1 May 2011 could validly be 
considered in proceedings under section 162(5) of the Act.  
What is not clear from the Act, though, is how far back item 7(7) of 
Schedule 5 to the Act extends in the context of section 162(5)(c) of the 
Act. Item 7(7) of Schedule 5 simply states that the right of a person to 
seek a remedy in terms of the Act applies with respect to conduct 
pertaining to a pre-existing company and "occurring before the effective 
date". In applying the remedy in section 162(5) of the Act in Gihwala the 
SCA considered conduct of the First and Second Appellants which had 
occurred as far back as 2005. This raises the question whether there is 
any limit on how many years before the effective date conduct may be 
taken into account in an application under section 162(5) of the Act. The 
answer to the converse question is equally unclear, that is, how many 
                                            
56  See Grancy para 162. See further Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 564. 
57  A pre-existing company is a company registered in terms of the 1973 Companies 
Act; an existing company in terms of the 1973 Companies Act (other than an 
external company); a close corporation which converted to a company under the Act, 
or a company which was deregistered in terms of the 1973 Companies Act and was 
subsequently registered in terms of the Act (see s 1 of the Act). 
58  Grancy para 163. 
59  National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 1995 1 SA 475 (A). 
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years after the conduct has occurred may an application under section 
162(5) of the Act be instituted. 
Under section 162(5)(c) of the Act a court must make an order declaring a 
person to be a delinquent director if the person "while a director" grossly 
abused his position, took personal advantage of information or an 
opportunity contrary to section 76(2)(a) of the Act, intentionally or by gross 
negligence inflicted harm upon the company or a subsidiary of the 
company contrary to section 76(2)(a) of the Act, or acted in a manner that 
amounted to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in 
relation to the performance of the director's functions within and duties to 
the company, or acted in a manner contemplated in section 77(3)(a), (b) or 
(c) of the Act. It is submitted that the words "while a director" indicate that 
the application may be brought at any time provided the offence was 
committed while the person was a director of the company. The only time 
limitation imposed in section 162 is that, in terms of section 162(2) of the 
Act, an application to declare a director delinquent may be brought if the 
person in question was a director of the company within the 24 months 
immediately preceding the application. Apart from this restriction, a 
prescription period has not been imposed under section 162 of the Act 
regarding the time period within which an application must be brought to 
declare a person a delinquent director. It is arguable that the Prescription 
Act 68 of 1969 would not apply in this instance because this statute 
applies primarily in regard to the acquisition of ownership by prescription, 
the acquisition and extinction of servitudes by prescription, and the 
prescription of debts, while section 162 of the Act relates to a declaration 
which affects the status of a person. 
In contrast, a prescription period has been imposed under section 77(7) of 
the Act in terms of which proceedings to recover any loss, damages or 
costs for which a person is or may be held liable in terms of section 77 of 
the Act may not be commenced more than three years after the act or 
omission that gave rise to that liability. It is curious that the legislature did 
not impose a prescription period in regard to section 162(5)(c) when it 
imposed a prescription period in regard to the liability of a director under 
section 77 of the Act, particularly since there is an overlap between some 
of the grounds of delinquency under section 162(5)(c) of the Act and the 
grounds of liability under section 77 of the Act. For instance, a breach of 
section 76(2)(a) and section 77(3)(a), (b) and (c) of the Act are grounds for 
a declaration of delinquency60 and at the same time are also grounds 
                                            
60  See s 162(5)(c) of the Act. 
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under which a director may be held liable for loss, damages or costs under 
section 77 of the Act.61 This means that one must recover loss, damages 
or costs from a director for a breach of section 77 of the Act within three 
years after the act or omission that gave rise to that liability, but one is not 
limited by this three year prescription period in regard to an application to 
declare a director delinquent for the same action under section 162(5)(c) 
of the Act. The failure of the legislature to expressly provide for a 
prescription period in section 162(5)(c) of the Act would suggest that a 
prescription period will not apply to section 162(5)(c) of the Act, but it 
remains to be seen how courts will interpret these provisions. 
A further curious provision of the Act in this context is section 162(2)(a), 
under which provision an application to declare a director delinquent may 
be brought if the person is a director of a company or was a director of that 
company within the 24 months immediately preceding the application. It is 
not clear why the legislature imposed a 24-month prescription period in 
regard to bringing an application of delinquency against a former director 
who is no longer a director of the company in question, but did not impose 
any prescription period at all in regard to a person who is currently still a 
director of the company in question. A person could well commit any of the 
offences set out in section 162(5)(c) of the Act and then simply resign from 
the company, or worse, be removed as a director of the company in terms 
of section 71 of the Act. If an application to declare him delinquent is not 
instituted within 24 months after his departure from the company, such a 
person would be immune from such an action. More disconcerting is that it 
is possible that the misconduct of a director may be discovered only more 
than 24 months after his resignation from a company, in which case he 
would at that stage be immune from a declaration of delinquency.  
The 24-month limitation in section 162(2)(a) of the Act strangely does not 
start to run once the applicant becomes aware of the misconduct of the 
director in question but starts to run as soon as the director in question 
ceases to be a director of the relevant company. It is not clear whether the 
24-month prescription period is merely arbitrary or whether there is a 
policy underlying it. If so, it is not clear what the policy is and why a three-
year prescription period was not adopted, bearing in mind that a 
declaration of delinquency may be instituted for serious misconduct and 
not for mere minor offences. 
                                            
61  See ss 77(2)(a) and 77(3)(a), (b) and (c) of the Act. 
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It is submitted that the legislature should consider whether a prescription 
period should be imposed under section 162(5)(c) of the Act. As the Court 
of Appeal asserted in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies,62 
per Hobhouse LJ, to be a director represents, or may represent a person's 
means of livelihood and his ability to carry on his business activities, and if 
he has to defend proceedings which may disqualify him from being a 
director, he should know about this within a reasonable time and not be 
left in a state of uncertainty.63 It is submitted further that the 24-month 
prescription period imposed on a director who ceases to be a director of a 
company should be extended to three years, so as to have some 
consistency and harmony with the three-year prescription period imposed 
in regard to section 77 of the Act, particularly since there is some overlap 
between the offences in section 77 and those set out in section 162(5)(c) 
of the Act.  
To revert to the question posed earlier, how far before the effective date of 
1 May 2011 may conduct of a director be considered for purposes of an 
application under section 162(5) of the Act? In the absence of any clear 
guidelines from the Act and in the light of the fact that there is no 
prescription period imposed on instituting an application to declare a 
director delinquent as long as he is still a director of the company in 
question, it seems that there is no limit on how many years before the 
effective date of 1 May 2011 the misconduct of a director must have 
occurred before it may be taken into account for the purposes of an 
application under section 162(5) of the Act.  
4.3  Discretion of a court under section 162(5) of the Act 
4.3.1 No discretion to declare a director delinquent  
The word "must" in section 162(5) of the Act makes it clear that a court is 
obliged to make an order declaring a person to be a delinquent director if 
any of the grounds set out in that section are satisfied, and that a court 
does not have any discretion in this regard. The SCA in Gihwala 
dismissed the argument of the First and Second Appellants that the 
absence of a discretion in section 162(5) of the Act rendered the provision 
unconstitutional, on the ground that section 162(5) is a rational and 
proportionate response by the legislature to the problem of delinquent 
directors.64 The SCA held that it is rational to remove a person from 
                                            
62  Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies 1996 4 All ER 289. 
63  Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies 1996 4 All ER 289 302. 
64  Gihwala para 145. 
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serving as a director on the basis that he was guilty of conduct falling 
within the categories specified in section 162(5)(c) of the Act.65  
In contrast, a court is given a discretion in deciding whether or not to 
remove a director from office in terms of section 71(6) of the Act.66 In 
terms of section 162(7) of the Act a court has also been given a discretion 
to decide whether or not to place a director under probation. The effect of 
an order of probation is that the person may not serve as a director, 
except to the extent permitted by the order of probation.67 Regarding the 
disqualification of a director, a court has again been given a discretion, 
under section 69(11) of the Act, to exempt a person from the application of 
any provision of section 69(8)(b) of the Act which sets out the instances 
when a person would be disqualified from being a director. It is 
questionable why a court has been given a discretion whether to remove a 
director from office, whether to place a director under probation, and 
whether to disqualify a person from being a director, but has not been 
given such a discretion under section 162(5) of the Act, when the effect of 
all of these provisions is that the director in question will not be permitted 
to serve as a director. The SCA in Gihwala did not address this issue. 
It may be that a court was denied a discretion under section 162(5) of the 
Act in the light of the seriousness of the offences listed in that section. 
Fault in the form of intent or gross negligence is required for an order in 
terms of section 162(5)(c) of the Act.68 As the SCA in Gihwala 
commented, the categories of conduct listed in section 162(5)(c) of the Act 
deal with instances of serious misconduct constituting gross abuses of the 
position of a director of a company.69 Although it is not clear, it may be that 
this is the reason why the legislature decided not to give a court a 
discretion whether or not to declare a director delinquent under section 
162(5) of the Act. 
                                            
65  Gihwala para 145.  
66  In terms of s 71(6)(a) of the Act, in the context of the removal of a director by the 
board of directors, if the board has determined that a director is not ineligible, 
disqualified or incapacitated, or has not been negligent or derelict in the performance 
of his functions as a director, any director who voted otherwise on the resolution or 
any shareholder who is entitled to vote in the election of that director, may apply to 
court to review the determination of the board of directors. Under s 71(6)(b) of the 
Act the court "may" on such an application confirm the determination of the board or 
remove the director from office if the court is satisfied that the director is ineligible or 
disqualified, incapacitated or has been negligent or derelict. 
67  See s 69(5) of the Act. 
68  Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 563. 
69  Gihwala paras 143-144. 
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It is notable that section 162(5)(c) of the Act is much stricter than the 
equivalent provisions in leading foreign jurisdictions that have influenced 
our Act. For instance section 8.09(a) of the United States of America 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 1984 (hereafter the MBCA) 
empowers a court to remove a director of a company if the court finds that 
"the director engaged in fraudulent conduct with respect to the corporation 
or its shareholders, grossly abused the position of director, or intentionally 
inflicted harm on the corporation" and, considering the director's course of 
conduct and the inadequacy of other available remedies, removal would 
be in the best interest of the corporation. The grounds set out in section 
8.09 of the MBCA under which a court may remove a director from office 
are akin to those grounds set out in section 162(5)(c) of the Act, but the 
difference between section 162(5)(c) of the Act and section 8.09(a) of the 
MBCA is that before a court may remove a director from office under 
section 8.09(a) of the MBCA it must consider whether or not removal 
would be in the best interest of the corporation in the light of the director's 
course of conduct, and the inadequacy of other available remedies.  
Similarly, under the Australian Corporations Act, 2001 (hereafter the 
Australian Corporations Act), a court is given a discretion, under grounds 
which are akin to those provided under section 162(5)(c) of the Act, 
whether or not to disqualify a person from managing a company. In terms 
of section 206C of the Australian Corporations Act, on application by ASIC 
a court may disqualify a person from managing corporations for a period 
that the court considers appropriate if a declaration is made under section 
1317E (civil penalty provision) that the person has contravened a 
corporation/scheme civil penalty provision, and if a court is satisfied that 
the disqualification is justified. Civil penalty provisions include the fiduciary 
duties of company directors, such as the duty to exercise powers and 
discharge duties in good faith, the duty not to improperly use one's 
position as a director or information obtained in the capacity as a director 
to gain an advantage for oneself or someone else or to cause detriment to 
the corporation.70 These grounds are very similar to the grounds provided 
for in section 162(5)(c) of the Act. However, unlike the position under the 
Act, in exercising its discretion under section 206C of the Australian 
Corporations Act whether or not to disqualify a director from managing 
corporations, the court may grant the disqualification if it is satisfied that 
the disqualification is justified. In determining if the disqualification is 
justified a court may have regard to the person's conduct in relation to the 
                                            
70  See ss 1317E, 180(1), 181(1), 182(1) and 183(1) of the Australian Corporations Act. 
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management, business or property of any corporation and to any other 
matters the court considers appropriate. 
Not only does section 162(5)(c) of the Act not give a court a discretion 
whether or not to disqualify a person from acting as a director, as is the 
case under the MBCA and the Australian Corporations Act, but it does not 
require a court to consider whether any other available remedies are 
adequate or whether the removal of the director from office would be in the 
best interest of the corporation (as required by section 8.09(a) of the 
MBCA), or to have regard to any matters the court considers appropriate 
(as required by section 206C of the Australian Corporations Act). In 
Gihwala the SCA stated that the fact that the foreign legislation gives 
courts a wider discretion in this context does not render section 162(5)(c) 
of the Act constitutionally problematic and that the provision remains a 
rational one.71 It is imperative to note, however, that section 5(2) of the Act 
states that a court interpreting or applying the Act may consider foreign 
company law to the extent appropriate. It would have been useful and 
instructive if the SCA had considered the equivalent provisions of leading 
foreign jurisdictions, as discussed above, in ascertaining the rationality of 
section 162(5)(c) of the Act. 
4.3.2  Discretion to determine whether the section 162(5)(c) grounds have 
been satisfied 
It would be misleading to hold that a court does not have any discretion at 
all under section 162(5)(c) of the Act. While a court may not have a 
discretion whether or not to declare a director delinquent if any of the 
grounds set out in section 162(5)(c) of the Act are satisfied, a court does 
have a discretion to determine whether the director's conduct amounts to 
"gross abuse", "gross negligence" or "wilful misconduct", as referred to in 
section 162(5)(c) of the Act. These terms have not been defined in the Act. 
A court would have to interpret them in the context of section 162(5)(c) of 
the Act, although they are not new terms in our law.  
Regarding the meaning of "gross negligence", in Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v 
Owners of the MV Stella Tingas72 the SCA stated that while gross 
negligence is not an exact concept capable of precise definition, it differs 
from ordinary negligence in that it involves a departure from the standard 
of the reasonable person to such an extent that it may properly be 
categorised as extreme. In Gihwala the SCA found that there was a long 
                                            
71  Gihwala para 145. 
72  Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v Owners of the MV Stella Tingas 1996 4 All ER 289 para 7. 
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history of courts treating gross negligence as the equivalent of 
recklessness when dealing with the conduct of those responsible for the 
administration of companies,73 and that recklessness is plainly serious 
misconduct.74 In KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v Hamman75 the court 
approved of and adopted into South African law the dictum regarding the 
meaning of the concept of "wilful misconduct" as advocated in Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd v South African Airways,76 where the concept of "wilful 
misconduct" was described as meaning conduct which goes far beyond 
negligence and involves a person doing or omitting to do that which is not 
only negligent but which he knows and appreciates is wrong, and is done 
or omitted regardless of the consequences.77 In Msimang v Katuliiba78 the 
court commented that in the determination of the terms "gross negligence" 
and "wilful misconduct" in the context of section 162(5)(c) of the Act, a 
court must have regard to the conduct of the directors in the performance 
of their duties as directors of the company in terms of the company's 
memorandum of incorporation and the statutory framework. In Druker the 
court approved of this approach.79 
In finding that the First Appellant had been grossly negligent in regard to 
the loans which had been provided to the Second Appellant, which had 
contravened section 226 of the 1973 Companies Act, the SCA placed 
emphasis on the fact that the First Appellant was at the time both a 
businessman and attorney, and also the chairman of one of South Africa's 
largest law firms and the chairman of Redefine Income Fund Limited, 
which was one of the largest property loan stock companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. These personal qualifications influenced 
the SCA in its finding that the failure of the First Appellant to observe the 
requirements of section 226 of the 1973 Companies Act was 
"inexcusable".80  
                                            
73  Gihwala para 144. See Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 
1998 2 SA 138 (SCA) 143-44; Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 
585 (SCA) para 13; and Tsung v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa 
2013 3 SA 468 (SCA) paras 29-31. 
74  Gihwala para 144. 
75  KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v Hamman 2002 3 SA 818 (W) para 17. 
76  Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v South African Airways 1977 1 Lloyd's Rep 564. 
77  Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v South African Airways 1977 1 Lloyd's Rep 564 
569. 
78  Msimang v Katuliiba 2012 JDR 2391 (GSJ) para 39. 
79  Druker para 84. 
80  Gihwala para 136. 
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In a similar vein, in Lobelo v Kukama81 the court found that the conduct of 
the first appellant, who was declared a delinquent director by the court, 
was "particularly inexplicable"82 considering the facts that he was a well-
qualified and experienced director who held more than one tertiary degree, 
owned significant business interests, held directorships in various 
companies and had been active in the corporate world for more than a 
decade.83 Based on these personal facts the court reasoned that the first 
appellant was quite able to familiarise himself with the obligations of a 
director of a company insofar as they related to the conduct of the 
business of the companies in question and that he was obliged to do so.84 
In Druker, too, the court drew attention to the fact that all the members of 
the board of directors, who were the respondents in the proceedings in 
terms of section 162(5)(c) of the Act, were persons with substantial tertiary 
qualifications, there being a medical practitioner, a legal practitioner, an 
accounting practitioner and other directors who held doctoral qualifications 
in their respective areas of knowledge.85 For this reason the court asserted 
that each one of the members of the board of directors ought to and 
should apply such skill as each of them possessed for the benefit of the 
company.86 
It is evident from a review of the case law that, in ascertaining whether a 
director has grossly abused his position as a director or has acted in a 
manner that amounted to gross negligence or wilful misconduct, in the 
context of section 162(5)(c) of the Act, a court will take into account the 
personal background and qualifications of the director in question. To this 
extent the test is subjective. The expectations of a director will vary 
according to his knowledge and experience, and a higher standard will be 
expected of educated and experienced persons. Thus, if a director has 
tertiary degrees and extensive experience his conduct will be measured 
against this higher subjective standard. In ascertaining whether the 
grounds in section 162(5)(c) of the Act have been breached, it thus seems 
that courts, in their discretion, apply both an objective and a subjective 
assessment. The objective element lies in ascertaining whether the 
conduct in question amounts to "gross abuse", "gross negligence" or 
"wilful misconduct", as referred to section 162(5)(c) of the Act and as 
defined in our law, while the subjective element lies in considering and 
                                            
81  Lobelo v Kukama 2013 JDR 1434 (GSJ). 
82  Lobelo v Kukama 2013 JDR 1434 (GSJ) para 25. 
83  Lobelo v Kukama 2013 JDR 1434 (GSJ) para 25. 
84  Lobelo v Kukama 2013 JDR 1434 (GSJ) para 25. 
85  Druker para 9. 
86  Druker para 9. 
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weighing the personal qualifications and experience of the director in 
question in determining whether the offences in question have been 
committed by such a director.  
4.3.3 No discretion to determine the minimum period of delinquency 
In terms of section 162(6)(b)(ii) of the Act, a declaration of delinquency 
under section 162(5)(c) of the Act subsists for seven years from the date 
of the order or such longer period as determined by the court at the time of 
making the declaration. A court has a discretion to extend the duration of 
the declaration of delinquency but it has no discretion to reduce it. In 
contrast, under section 206C of the Australian Corporations Act, under 
circumstances akin to those set out in section 162(5)(c) of the Act, a court 
may disqualify a person from managing corporations for a period that it 
considers appropriate. 
4.3.4  Discretion to convert the delinquency order into a probation order 
While a court may not have a discretion to determine the minimum period 
of the declaration of delinquency, it does have a discretion to determine 
whether to relax the declaration of delinquency after a period of three 
years and to place the person under probation instead. In terms of section 
162(11)(a) of the Act, save in certain instances87 a person who has been 
declared delinquent may apply to a court to suspend the order of 
delinquency and replace it with an order of probation, with or without 
conditions, at any time more than three years after the order of 
delinquency was made. If the delinquency order is so suspended it may be 
set aside by a court at any time more than two years after it was 
suspended.88  
In considering these applications, a court may not grant the order applied 
for unless the applicant has satisfied any conditions that were attached to 
the order.89 A court may in its discretion grant the order if, having regard to 
the circumstances leading to the original order and the conduct of the 
applicant in the ensuing period, the court is satisfied that the applicant has 
demonstrated satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation and there is a 
                                            
87  In terms of s 162(11) of the Act, an application to court to suspend an order of 
delinquency or to set it aside may not be brought if a director consented to serve as 
a director or acted in the capacity of a director while ineligible or disqualified or while 
under a probation order acted as a director in a manner that contravened that order. 
In such instances the declaration of delinquency is unconditional and subsists for the 
lifetime of the person declared delinquent. 
88  Section 162(11)(b) of the Act. 
89  Section 162(12)(a) of the Act. 
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reasonable prospect that the applicant would be able to serve successfully 
as a director of a company in the future.90  
4.3.5 Discretion to impose conditions to a declaration of delinquency 
A court is empowered to make a declaration of delinquency subject to any 
conditions it considers appropriate, including conditions limiting the 
application of the declaration to one or more particular categories of 
companies.91 An example of such a limitation, as provided by the SCA in 
Gihwala, is that a director may be declared delinquent in relation to a 
financial services company but may be permitted to be a director of an 
engineering firm.92 Another example emanates from Druker, where the 
court limited the declaration of delinquency to the directorship which the 
directors in question held in one particular company and did not extend it 
to any other corporate entities which the directors used in the conduct of 
practice of their profession.93 In Demetriades v Tollie94 the court also 
limited the declaration of delinquency to one particular company only. 
Some of the conditions a court may determine in relation to a declaration 
of delinquency, in its discretion, are that the person concerned must 
undertake a designated programme of remedial education relevant to the 
nature of the person's conduct as a director, carry out a designated 
programme of community service, or pay compensation to any person 
adversely affected by the person's conduct as a director to the extent that 
such a victim does not otherwise have a legal basis to claim 
compensation.95 This is not a closed list and a court's power to make 
conditions ancillary to the declaration of delinquency is not limited.96  
                                            
90  Section 162(12)(b) of the Act. 
91  Section 162(6)(b)(i) of the Act. 
92  Gihwala para 144. 
93  Druker para 91. 
94  Demetriades v Tollie 2015 ZANCHC 17 (18 September 2015) para 61. 
95  Section 162(10) of the Act. The validity of this provision is questionable because it 
may be interpreted to mean that if one of the elements which ought to be present for 
contractual or delictual liability is not established a court may nevertheless order a 
director to pay compensation to a victim in circumstances when such an order would 
not ordinarily have been made under the principles of contract or delict law (Cassim 
"Governance and the Board of Directors" 438). 
96  See s 162(10) of the Act. In terms of s 69(13) of the Act the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission must establish and maintain a public register of 
persons who are disqualified from serving as a director. Under s 69(8)(a) of the Act a 
person would be disqualified to be a director if a court has declared the person to be 
delinquent in terms of s 162 of the Act. Accordingly the public register would 
arguably include persons who have been declared delinquent by a court in terms of 
s 162 of the Act. 
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In Grancy the Western Cape High Court asserted that, in view of the 
persistent serious misconduct of the First and Second Appellants, this was 
not a case where the court should consider imposing conditions limiting 
the application of the declarations of delinquency. The court accordingly 
issued unqualified declarations of delinquency against the First and 
Second Appellants.97 Likewise, the SCA in Gihwala did not impose any 
conditions on the declaration of delinquency against the First and Second 
Appellants. 
Once the delinquency order expires, the director in question would be free 
to act as a director of a company again. It is accordingly submitted that, 
particularly in the light of the purpose of section 162 of the Act being 
protective of the public rather than penal, as maintained in Gihwala,98 
courts ought to make better use of conditions and they ought to impose 
suitable ancillary conditions to declarations of delinquency in an effort to 
effectively protect the public from any repeat of the conduct by the 
directors in question and to facilitate the rehabilitation of delinquent 
directors. 
5  Conclusion 
In Gihwala the SCA undoubtedly clarified some important matters 
surrounding the declaration of delinquency of a director under section 
162(5) of the Act. It is clear that, on account of item 7(7) of Schedule 5 to 
the Act, conduct which had occurred prior to the effective date of the Act, 
being 1 May 2011, may be considered in an application to declare a 
director delinquent. What is not clear from the Act, though, is how far back 
item 7(7) of Schedule 5 to the Act extends in the context of section 
162(5)(c) of the Act. This note has argued that there does not appear to be 
any time limit on how many years prior to the effective date of 1 May 2011 
the conduct of a director may be taken into account for the purposes of an 
application under section 162(5) of the Act. This note has discussed some 
anomalies in regard to the two-year prescription which has been imposed 
by section 162(2) of the Act in regard to a person who was a director of a 
company and who has since ceased to be a director of that company. It 
has suggested that the legislature should consider extending the two-year 
prescription period to a three-year prescription period. It was further 
suggested that a prescription period ought to be imposed in regard to 
                                            
97  See Grancy paras 207-208. 
98  See Gihwala para 142. 
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instituting an application to declare a director delinquent under section 
162(5)(c) of the Act. 
The SCA in Gihwala dismissed the argument that the absence of a 
discretion given to a court whether to make a declaration of delinquency 
under section 162(5) of the Act rendered the provision unconstitutional. As 
pointed out in this note, section 162(5)(c) of the Act is much stricter than 
the equivalent provisions under comparable leading foreign jurisdictions. It 
is regrettable that the SCA did not examine and consider the law of 
leading foreign jurisdictions that have influenced our Act in ascertaining 
the rationality of section 162(5)(c) of the Act, particularly in the light of the 
fact that section 5(2) of the Act states that a court interpreting or applying 
the Act may consider foreign company law to the extent appropriate. 
In finding that the conduct of the First Appellant had constituted gross 
negligence, the SCA in Gihwala was influenced by the personal 
qualifications and experience of the First Appellant. This note has argued 
that in ascertaining whether the grounds specified in section 162(5)(c) of 
the Act have been breached, the courts apply both an objective and a 
subjective assessment. The objective element lies in ascertaining whether 
the conduct in question amounts to "gross abuse", "gross negligence" or 
"wilful misconduct", as referred to in section 162(5)(c) of the Act and as 
defined in our law, while the subjective element lies in considering and 
weighing the personal qualifications and experience of the director in 
question.  
In Gihwala the SCA did not impose any conditions on the declaration of 
delinquency against the First and Second Appellants. A declaration of 
delinquency is a harsh and serious order, particularly so under section 
162(5) of the Act, which is much stricter than the equivalent provisions in 
leading foreign jurisdictions. In the light of the fact that section 162(5) of 
the Act is said by the SCA in Gihwala to be protective of the public rather 
than penal, this note has argued that courts ought to make more effective 
use of their power to impose appropriate ancillary conditions to 
declarations of delinquency in an effort to protect the public from any 
repeat of the conduct by the directors in question and to facilitate the 
rehabilitation of delinquent directors.  
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